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Executive Summary
With the wave of New Public Management, privatization of services in the public sector
became a popular choice among government managers who believed this would improve the
quality of services while also lowering costs. This turned out to not always be the case, and
municipalities have slowly begun to turn towards the remunicipalization of services that were
once contracted out. The purpose of this research paper is to take a Canadian case of
remunicipalization and analyze what the primary reasons were for remunicipalization. The city
of Ottawa served as the case example and the research paper identified that the City decided to
remunicipalize a portion of residential solid waste collection services in 2011 because it could
perform the service at a lower cost, improve the quality of service, and allow the municipality to
have more control over the service. Ottawa possessed similarities and differences with global
trends of remunicipalization, however, each case of remunicipalization will always be unique
depending on its specific circumstances and should be studied on an individual level to
understand how the decision was made. It is encouraged that more research be conducted on
remunicipalization in order to shine more light on the benefits that it can offer municipalities.
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Introduction
The adoption of private sector practices in the public sector was viewed as a groundbreaking
phenomenon back in the 1980’s and 1990’s. This innovative transition of government practice
was given a great deal of research and study to identify the benefits that privatization can provide
in government. For decades, local governments in Canada and around the world have felt the
pressure to contract out or privatize their services, which is a tenet of the neo-liberal program.
However, the promised benefits of this practice are not always fulfilled and can leave local
government managers frustrated. Research on the outcomes of privatization has demonstrated
that contracting out services does not always result in cost savings or increased service quality.
As a result, services that were once outsourced are finding their way back home through the
recent trend of remunicipalization. Unfortunately, this trend has not gathered much attention
from the academic world, especially in Canada. Research has been scarce on the issue, with only
a handful of studies primarily in European countries and the United States. In contrast, much
research exists on the decision to privatize. This raises the question of why is there so little
research on remunicipalization? When private contractors cause problems for the municipality,
oftentimes the municipality will seek a solution by finding a new contractor. But do municipal
managers recognize the potential benefits of bringing a service back in-house? These benefits
may include improved quality of service, lower costs, increased control over a service, etc.
One of the more prominent examples of remunicipalization is within municipal waste
collection services; it is one of the most often analyzed sectors. Waste collection is an extremely
important service that affects all citizens and some municipalities in Canada have realized that
the best delivery of the service can be achieved from bringing it back in-house.
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The objective of this research paper is to shed light on this trend of remunicipalization in
Canada, which has been neglected by researchers, with a focus on waste collection. The question
that needs to be answered is: what are the main reasons a municipality remunicipalizes solid
waste collection services? A case study from Ottawa, Ontario will be analyzed in depth to
understand the key factors and reasons for remunicipalizing waste collection. Additionally, this
case will be compared to research available from Europe, the United States, and Canada to find
any similarities and/or differences with other global trends.

Breaking Down Remunicipalization
Remunicipalization is not a common term in the local government setting. As stated, this is
only a small, emerging trend, and the definition of this term has varied conceptually. Scholars
have used different concepts to capture this development and define the term remunicipalization
(Clifton, Warner, Gradus, and Gel, 2019). In Europe, privatization was understood as the selling
of public assets to the private sector. Hence, working on the reversal of this process, scholars in
Europe pointed to cases of the renationalization of assets, whereby previously privatized stateowned assets were brought back into public ownership (Clifton, Warner, Gradus, and Gel, 2019).
The United States on the other hand viewed privatization as contracting out, so scholars studied
cases where the municipality decided to reverse the decision to privatize and produce services inhouse once more (Clifton, Warner, Gradus, and Gel, 2019). Upon review of some Canadian
cases, the definition of remunicipalization is aligned more with how the United States has
defined remunicipalization. Therefore, this paper will define remunicipalization as the act of a
municipal body of government deciding to bring a contracted service back in-house for the
municipality to operate either partially or fully.
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Waste collection services in particular have been focused on since they are often one of the
more popular services to be remunicipalized. Waste collection is the collection of solid waste
from point of production to the point of treatment or disposal (Hoornewg and Bhada-Tata, 2012).
Municipal waste can be collected in several ways, including house-to-house pick up, community
bins pick up, curbside pickup, or self-delivered where generators deliver the waste directly to
disposal sites. The level of service often varies by municipality and depends on local
circumstances; small communities often provide drop off collection service while larger
municipalities will offer curbside or similar pick up collection (Kelleher, Robins and Dixie,
2005). To finance this service, municipalities generally follow either of two practices: partial or
full user fee system where citizens have to pay a fee for each bag after a certain limit, or property
taxes pay for the service. As a result, part of the contracting out decision is based on how the
garbage is collected. Types of contractors who bid on the contract will depend on the collection
system. For example, if the contract involves having wheel carts that need power lifters on the
side of the truck, this would make the cost of providing the service more expensive. The number
of times collection is provided varies as well depending on the municipality’s goals. Some
municipalities specify 5-day collection while others may have a 9-day collection period in order
to be environmentally sensitive; less pickups reduces carbon effect from trucks and makes
people more conservative when disposing waste.
The Future is Public is an organization composed of union leaders, activists, researchers, and
community groups that share ideas and proposals around building a pro-public movement in
Canada. The organization has a database that has tracked (almost) every case of
remunicipalization that has occurred throughout the world since 2005, with a majority of cases
coming after 2010 (Future is Public, 2019). A vast majority of the cases belong to European
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countries, especially Denmark, Norway, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Spain for
remunicipalized waste collection services. In Canadian waste collection cases, there are 5
Canadian municipalities listed: City of Saint John (NB), Sherbrooke (QB), Conception Bay
South (NFL), Port Moody (BC), and Paradise (NFL). (Future is Public, 2019). While there is
very limited research done in Canada, one study examined the cases of Saint John, Sherbrooke,
Conception Bay South, and Port Moody (Reynolds, Royer, and Beresford, 2016). Winnipeg has
also announced a two-year pilot project that would bring some waste collection back in-house;
however, this project has been delayed (Foxall, 2020).
The research on this trend is limited, and any research that has been done on Canadian
municipalities has been brief. Therefore, analyzing Ottawa in depth can be an essential way of
dissecting the specific reasons as to why the municipality brought waste collection back inhouse. This will include identifying the particular actors or parties responsible for advocating the
City to bring waste collection services in-house. Furthermore, the goal is to not only find the
specific reasons for remunicipalizing but to also look at where these municipalities fit in the
remunicipalization trend. As the literature review will show, there are trends of
remunicipalization in Europe, the United States, and just recently, in Canada. By comparing the
Ottawa case study to these global trends, any similarities and/or differences can be identified to
see if the Ottawa case is aligned with a particular global trend, or if it encompasses multiple
facets of these trends.

Literature Review
State of Literature
Remunicipalization is more common in Europe and the United States, and as a result, most of
the literature is based on literature from the United States and Europe. Additionally, a significant
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amount of literature is focused on multiple services being remunicipalized; however, solid waste
collection and water distribution sectors are the most analyzed services (Demuth, Friederiszick,
and Reinhold, 2018). Most research has followed the decisions to privatize a service in a local
government, and relatively little attention has been given to the more recent trend of
remunicipalization (Hefetz and Warner, 2007). This is extremely problematic given the evidence
that more and more municipalities in the world are rethinking how they are providing public
services. Finally, while more recent research has been done in Europe, most of the research from
North America is becoming out of date. Therefore, this vacant area of recent research must be
fulfilled to understand the current climate of remunicipalization within local government,
especially in Canada.
Moving from Privatization to Remunicipalization
Since the 1980’s, governments, consultants, and lobbyists have authored and sponsored dozens
of reports promoting the idea of New Public Management and contracting out services
(Reynolds, Royer, and Beresford, 2016). New Public Management encourages governments to
be more efficient and responsive by transforming the public sector through the adaptation of
private sector and market-based approaches towards service delivery (Hefetz and Warner, 2007).
As experience with New Public Management grew, however, frustration began to emerge from
local government managers (Hefetz and Warner, 2007). While proponents of privatization would
argue it would typically offer a superior form of service delivery to urban governments,
experience has raised concerns about the lack of cost savings. Faced with limited revenues and
rising costs, local governments must decide which services to provide to their citizens, how these
services will be delivered, and how they will be funded. Each country has different reasons and
pressures facing them when deciding how to provide services.
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Situational Factors
Some municipalities decide to keep services privatized while others decide to bring back
services in-house: but why? Before diving into what the main reasons are for remunicipalization,
there are certain situational factors that explain why a municipality may be more likely to
remunicipalize a service than another.
The amount of competition present in a marketplace is an important factor in deciding whether
a municipality will bring back services in-house. One would expect remunicipalization to happen
in the case of insufficient competition at the moment of re-tendering a contract and when costefficient public alternatives are available (Demuth, Friederiszick, and Reinhold, 2018).
Competitive markets on the other hand make contracting more effective by providing
governments with information about the trade-offs between price and quality across different
vendors and by disciplining vendors for poor performance (Brown and Potoski, 2003). However,
competitive markets are hard to maintain, and research indicates efforts to maintain such
competition distract public managers from other tasks such as monitoring to ensure service
quality (Warner, 2016). The market of solid waste collection tends to have more competition
than other services and therefore privatization is more common; other services such as water
distribution has high asset specificity and tends toward a natural monopoly (Bel, Fageda, and
Warner, 2010).
Second, opposition from political bodies and organizations can play a role in
remunicipalization. Politics is part of public management and good managers do not just make
technical decisions; they also interact in the political process. Municipal bodies with left wing
councils are more likely to push for remunicipalization than right wing councils (Gradus and
Budding, 2018). However, there is inconclusive research on how much of a role this actually
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plays; instead, research has indicated that political ideology may be context specific. A Dutch
study found that ideology had a strong influence on the decision to remunicipalize while German
research has indicated that political ideology was less relevant for the choice (Demuth,
Friederiszick, and Reinhold, 2018). In the Dutch case, they found that the higher the proportion
of left leaning councillors increased the likelihood that the municipality would reverse privatize a
service; the Dutch use a proportional representation system where the divisions in an electorate
are reflected proportionally in the elected body.
Local unions also are heavily involved in arguing for remunicipalization. Due to the threat
privatization poses to their member’s jobs and working conditions, municipal unions will often
strongly oppose the privatization of public services. During the process of deciding who to award
a contract to, unions develop strategies and policies to promote remunicipalization; this involves
strategies for intervening in political processes before decisions are made (Hall, 2012). Strategies
often include convincing public managers and council through qualitative and quantitative
criteria that in-house service delivery is a superior alternative to privatization (Cyr-Racine and
Jalette, 2007). Therefore, the degree to which municipal unions have an influence on the decision
to remunicipalize depends on how well they can gather resources and formulate a strong
argument to remunicipalize a service. For example, a Montreal study analyzed a case where a
municipality had contracted out its snow removal services. The union spend a significant amount
of time gathering information and elaborated a complete public-private cost figure for snow
clearance (Cyr-Racine and Jalette, 2007). The union had formed an alliance with the joint
subcontracting committee to make the case for remunicipalization and proved the service was
costing the City double the price it would pay to have the service conducted in-house (CyrRacine and Jalette, 2007). Lots of pressure was put on the administration after this new data was
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presented by the union, and the City ended up bringing the service back in-house. This case
demonstrated that the ability to develop arguments, collect data, and form alliances can increase
union pressure on the decision to remunicipalize.
Reasons to Remunicipalize
Aside from the situational factors that affect this decision, there are several main reasons why a
municipality decides to bring a service back in-house.
Costs serve as one of the most important reasons that a municipality decides to remunicipalize.
There is an assumption that privatization leads to cost savings for a municipality, however, it
should be noted that research has indicated there is not a genuine empirical effect of cost savings
resulting from private production (Bel, Fageda, and Warner, 2010). Transaction costs play a
significant role in the level of costs a service produces. These costs include contract design,
finding a qualified contractor, and monitoring the contractor (Warner, 2016). This theory
explains that services that are more asset speciﬁc (requiring speciﬁc physical infrastructure or
technical expertise) and are more difﬁcult to manage are less likely to be contracted out (Warner
and Hefetz, 2012). Primarily, transaction costs are of significance as they are responsible for the
greater likelihood of savings for waste collection; waste collection has a moderate level of asset
specificity and a low difficulty measuring outcomes and therefore transaction costs are expected
to be lower than other services like water (Schoute, Budding, and Gradus, (2017). However,
governments that contract more with for profit vendors will conduct more monitoring activities,
thus raising costs. Monitoring is costly in terms of time and information; case studies in the
United States indicate monitoring costs represent 20% of the total contract (Hefetz and Warner
2004). Government managers consider monitoring to be an important factor in their decision,
and so those who highly invest in monitoring are more likely to bring services back in-house
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since they are keeping a close eye on the outcomes of contracts. It should also be noted that
governments with a low level of monitoring capacity appear to use remunicipalization as a
substitute for monitoring (Hefetz and Warner, 2004). If the municipality has relatively low
contract management capacity, it is often difficult to have sufficient resources to monitor
contracts, especially complex ones; less than half of municipalities from a U.S survey indicated
they actively monitored contracts (Hefetz and Warner, 2004). As a result, municipalities with
low contract management capacity (often counties) had the highest rate of remunicipalization
due to the limited government capacity to monitor contracts.
Deterioration in service quality is another strong reason why municipalities decide to bring
services back in-house. As stated, private for-profit vendors are more likely to try to cut costs by
lowering the quality of service they deliver. Monitoring costs rise as service quality decreases, as
research indicates that disappointment with service quality and high monitoring were major
reasons for remunicipalization (Ballard and Warner, 2000). Residents complain to the
municipality if service quality decreases, which results in a significant amount of time and
resources being wasted by city employees. Not only are city employees required to handle these
complaints, but they then had to visit the site in question to check up on the contractor's work,
contact the contractor to inform them of the problem, and finally revisit the site to ensure that the
work had been re-done properly (Ballard and Warner, 2000). The level of complaints on service
quality were much higher than when the municipality delivered the service and as a result, the
service was brought back in-house. In the service area of waste collection, a recent German study
found that safety indicators such as road-safe collection vehicle, positioning of the waste
container after collection, and remaining contents in the waste container received the lowest
percentage of fulfilment probability (Schulte, Gellenbeck, and Nelles, 2017). These can represent
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key service quality indicators when municipalities are measuring service quality during a
decision to potentially contract back in-house.
A third reason for remunicipalization comes from the recognition that the municipality must
retain some level of public control. This may be why a municipality decides to bring services
partially back in-house through a mixed public and private service delivery model in order to
regain some control over the service delivery (Warner, 2016). Related to this, the principle agent
problems can be a reason why a municipality wants to regain control. If there is goal
incongruence between the contractor and the municipality, then the municipalities will often be
more inclined to contract back in to gain control over the service to produce their desired goals
(Hefetz and Warer, 2004). In some cases, either a growth in the size of the community or an
amalgamation leading to the creation of a larger community allowed the municipality to have the
capacity to take back control of a particular service (Reynolds, Royer, and Beresford, 2016). For
example, the Township of Cumberland, Ontario announced plans for a sports complex, but did
not have the management capacity to manage the facility so they contracted it out. Ten years
later in 2001, the township was amalgamated with Ottawa, who then had the service brought
back in-house because the township now had more resources and an increased capacity to
manage the sports complex (Reynolds, Royer, and Beresford, 2016).
Finally, tying in with service quality, public value plays a strong in role in affecting a
municipality’s decision to remunicipalize. New public service literature in particular argues local
government managers who use market approaches to deliver services must balance an even
wider set of concerns, including accountability and public preference (Hefetz and Warner, 2004).
The shift in local government practice towards remunicipalization is a rebalancing effort that
reflects the emergence of the social choice position which values both markets and citizens
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voice. The social choice approach argues local governments are to create a framework for a
deliberative process where citizens develop the political capacity to engage their differences and
identify solutions (Hefetz and Warner, 2007). U.S based studies from 1992-2002 show that the
shift to bringing services back in-house was due to a shift in the managerial learning process in
which there was a recognition to seek a balance of citizen voice with market management issues.
(Hefetz and Warner, 2007). This increased recognition of the value that citizen voice plays in
market management led to a higher rate of remunicipalization. For example, the study indicated
many governments contracted out recreational services for efficiency gains, however, the
citizen’s concern over access and control fueled a large reverse contracting process (Hefetz and
Warner, 2007).
The United States
In the United States, contracting out is a long-standing practice; in fact, many urban services
(especially social services) began in the private sector and shifted to public provision during the
20th century (Warner and Hefetz, 2012). The United States can gather data on the status of
municipal services through the International City/County Management Association (ICMA)
survey, which occurs every 5 years and differentiates stable public delivery and continued
contracting from experimentation with new outsourcing and new insourcing (Warner and Hefetz,
2012). The United States is the only country with this longitudinal data that permit analysis of
contracting dynamics overtime. Data indicated that in the 1990’s insourcing was primarily a
substitute for monitoring, as few governments monitored their contracts. The peak of
privatization among U.S local governments was in 1997. However, a study from 1997-2002
found that reverse privatization had risen 18% among local government services and exceeded
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the rate of new contracting out (Warner and Hefetz, 2012). As of 2012, the level of reverse
contracting (insourcing) now equals the level of new contracting out in the United States.
In the United States, local governments are free to experiment without state directives to
privatize, as has occurred in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and now the EU (Warner, 2016).
This is the main reason why research has identified lower rates of privatization and higher rates
of remunicipalization among local governments in the U.S compared to Europe (Warner, 2016).
In the United States, mixed market delivery is more common and enables ongoing public
presence in a particular service. For example, a city may be divided into districts with some
served by private contractors and others served by the public. This enables a benchmarking
process of costs across the public and private partners that stimulates innovation and retains
avenues for citizen engagement (Warner, 2016). The process with the private sector promotes
bureaucratic competition in-house by benchmarking costs and quality with in-house operations,
thus putting pressure on private contractors to keep up quality and reduce costs (Warner and
Hefetz, 2008). From 2007-2012, ICMA data identified that contracts to for-profit partners are
60% more likely to be reversed than contracts to other governments (Warner, 2016). Based on
this same survey, mixed contracts are more three times more likely to be with for-profit partners
than with other municipalities (Warner, 2016). City managers recognize that if they want to
contract with for-profit partners, then they can enhance their ability to manage by retaining a
mixed market position. However, governments were more likely to have contracts with other
municipalities if they were contracting out complete contracts. This is because when services are
fully contracted out, municipalities are less likely to reverse privatize; contracting with other
municipalities is preferred to contracting out with private partners (Warner, 2016).
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Public managers in the United States place a great deal of emphasis to remunicipalize services
based on concerns over contract monitoring, service quality, and costs (Hebdon and Jalette,
2008). Costs and efficiency play an extremely important role in trying to decide how to conduct
a public service in the United States; 83% of government managers between 1992 and 1997
reported attempts to decrease costs. Service quality also served as the single biggest reason in
2002-2007 where 61% of municipalities brought services back in-house due to concerns over
service quality (CCPA, 2015). Additionally, politics also plays a more prominent role in the U.S
for deciding whether to privatize or reverse privatize public services. Politicians might choose to
provide services in-house to gain political benefits such as support from local unions,
opportunities to purchase supplies from local allies, and the ability to use government employees
on political projects (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). To decrease the amount of
political influence on the decision to contract or not, states can have state clean government laws
which enforce a merit-based hiring system, standards requiring counties to use competitive
bidding on all purchases, and forbid political activity by government employees. A U.S based
study concluded that states who enforced these clean state laws have an increased level of
privatization due to the hindering of political motives (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1997). While it is not proved that states that do not possess or have weak state clean government
laws are more likely to remunicipalize services, it can be assumed that politics will play a
heavier role in the decision and can serve as a motive.
Europe
Public services have a strong history of being provided by local government in Europe. Dating
back to 19th century Europe, the provision of public utilities in its initial basic form was deemed
mainly a responsibility of the local authorities (Wollmann, 2014). With the expansion of the
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national welfare state which unfolded in the early 20th century and climaxed during the 1960’s
and 1970’s, the provision of public services was engraved into being a key responsibility of local
municipalities (Wollmann, 2014). This development was rooted in the belief that the conduct of
public services in the best interest of the citizens was ensured by having them done by the public
sector; for example, France nationalized the energy sector after World War II.
However, the public sector-centered form of public service provision came under attack by the
advocates of neo-liberal beliefs and New Public Management who claimed the current structure
was inefficient. A sense of criticism was perpetuated that the public sector operated under a
sense of political rationality that gave a priority to social and ecological goals and neglected
economic rationality (Wollmann, 2014). This neo-liberal shift received its initial powerful thrust
in the United Kingdom after Margaret Thatcher’s conservative regime was elected in 1979 and
the neo-liberal ideology quickly spread to other European countries. For example, the
Netherlands switched their provision of garbage collection from the late 1990’s towards the mid
2000’s, with two-thirds of the switches being towards outside production (Schoute, Budding,
and Gradus, 2017). While this sparked more privatization of public services at the municipal
level, it eventually became evident in the 1990’s that these neo-liberal promises that privatization
would usher in better quality of services at lower prices did not materialize (Wollmann, 2014).
Instead, providers had often made use of the next possible opportunity to raise prices while at the
same time deteriorating the working conditions of their employees. This would tie in with the
corresponding shift in the national and international discourse in which, in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis, the relationship between the state and the private sector had been critically
scrutinized and the crucial role of the state in redressing private sector and market failures was
rediscovered.
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This distrust in the private sector following the 2008 crisis had a stronger impact on European
countries who used to heavily value the presence of government services and lost confidence in
the performance of the marketplace and corporations. For example, 60% of local authorities
indicated they have begun or were preparing to take previously outsourced services back inhouse (Wollmann, 2014). The Association for Public Service in the UK found that 67% of 140
municipalities surveyed had either brought a service back in-house or were considering doing so
(Reynolds, Royer, and Beresford, 2016). Germany has begun to bring back their energy sector
due to the growing support from the German public which is very critical of energy privatization
from increased concerns over environmental issues; they have also brought waste collection and
water back in-house (Hall, 2012). France’s Inspection genereale des Finances even condemned
the use of public private partnerships back in 2014 to spark an anti PPP movement (Clifton,
Warner, Gradus, and Gel, 2019). This overall reassessment of the merits of public-sector based
service provision is also reflected in a growing popular perception which tends to value public
sector service provision higher that the private sector one. This trend is evidenced by a growing
number of local referendums in which the privatization of public services and facilities is
rejected or their remunicipalization is demanded (Wollmann, 2014).
In relation to waste collection, research on several European countries such as the UK,
Germany, and France have indicated the main reason for remunicipalization was costs, control,
and contract expiry (Hall, 20120). A recent survey of German municipalities also indicated that
remunicipaliztion was an opportunity to regain political control over the quality and price-setting
of service provision (Wollmann, 2014). Additionally, while in the U.S political influence can
play a contributing role in the decision to bring a service back in-house or not based on state
clean government laws, more general findings in European literature has found there does not
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seem to be an effect from political ideology to remunicipalize services. Instead, the decision of a
European municipality is more pragmatic than ideological; the exception is in the Netherlands
where ideology played a significant role in choices in service delivery (Gradus and Budding,
2018). In this case, left leaning municipal councils were more likely to reverse privatize services
than right leaning councils.
Canada
While research on remunicipalization is generally limited, the literature pertaining to this
decision in Canadian research is scarcer than in Europe or the United States. The
remunicipalization movement in Canada is still relatively small, geographically scattered, and is
conceptually varied. The vast majority of privatization in Canada has taken the form of public
private partnerships, which leads to a false conception of a country with deep-seated
commitments to equitable public service delivery when, in reality, there has been a drastic
erosion of this model and a growing preference for private sector actors and market-orientated
operating services (McDonald, 2018). Unions have strongly campaigned against privatization,
but these concerns have not been as influential. There is not a lot of media coverage on this trend
and in practice, there is no distinctly pro-public movement in Canada. The main issue is it has
been often challenging to find common ground on what constitutes a “good” public service, with
different organizations having diverse ideological orientations and sectoral interests. Any
collective demands to return to “public” control of essential services must acknowledge, engage
with, and encourage differences of opinion on what to reclaim and what to reject, instead of
assuming the status quo (McDonald, 2018). An offensive and defensive strategy would need to
be developed to not only argue why privatization is bad, but why bringing back public services
in-house is good. Unfortunately, there are no dedicated journals on the topic, and while panels
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and papers about the problems of privatization exist, pro-public debates rarely feature as
standalone themes in academic publications or conferences.
Canada’s political landscape has fewer political parties than many countries where such propublic debates are flourishing; countries such as France, Spain, and Bolivia, with strong socialist,
anarchist, and other radical traditions due to lots of proportional based electoral systems.
Additionally, the international pro-public experience shows the importance of citizen
engagement (as opposed to governments or unions driving change); this can be demonstrated
from German citizens voicing their concerns with the privatized energy sector (McDonald,
2018). While a top-down movement can be effective, bottom-up mobilizations have been a
critical part of building and sustaining many pro-public movements in Europe. For example,
Spanish elections of left-leaning governments in 2015 to 2016 led to a rapid change in public
awareness and attitudes towards remunicipalization (McDonald, 2018). Some countries have
used referendums to raise public awareness and create a pro-public movement. This can be
demonstrated in the 2004 national referendum in Uruguay which introduced an amendment to its
Constitution outlawing water privatization (McDonald, 2018).
This does not mean that Canada has not participated in this movement, but rather this trend
has not exactly taken off in Canada fully. Canada’s Intergovernmental Committee on Urban and
Regional Research produced a report in 1997 that showed 40% of municipal services were being
brought back in-house (McDonald, 2018). In the Canadian context for remunicipalization,
several reasons for deciding to bring back services in-house include cost savings, better quality
control, flexibility over a service, efficiency in operations, problems with contractors, increased
staff capacity, and more support from citizens. Additionally, local governments in different
provinces varied significantly in both their own source of revenues and in funding by higher

18

levels of government. It should be noted that because of the devolution of services by Canadian
provinces to the cities without the necessary funding, it is conceivable that managers may be
under more pressure to restructure than their American counterparts (Reynolds, Royer, and
Beresford, 2016).
Since there is no survey system like ICMA, various case studies have been done on Canadian
cities who have remunicipalized services. The city of Hamilton remunicipalized their water
service after a campaign of local civil society groups and a handful of local politicians pointed at
the previous contract’s flaws and the operational failures of the private operators. No company
was interested in taking on the full liabilities associated with the contract, so the city had no
choice but to bring back the service in-house (Martin, 2012). Other cities such as Sherbrooke,
Saint John, Port Moody, and Conception Bay South have been studied as cases for partially or
fully bringing waste collection services back in-house. The main reasons for switching back in
these cases was due to a decrease in quality of services and high costs; Saint John indicated they
saved $700,000 in the first year of remunicipalization (Reynolds, Royer, and Beresford, 2016).
In the same Canadian study, 12/15 municipalities indicated that cost savings was the main reason
for bringing services back in-house (Reynolds, Royer, and Beresford, 2016). However, despite
these cases, Canada still has more privatization than the United States. This is surprising
considering studies have shown that Canadians are more likely than Americans to have positive
attitudes towards government and a greater public sector union density (Hebdon and Jalette,
2008). It’s clear that Canada still lags behind the rest of the world, so in order to possibly
generate a pro-public movement in Canada, more research and literature must be presented on
the issue in order to bring it to light.
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Methodology
This paper’s primary aim is to look at a specific case study and provide an in-depth analysis of
the entire process surrounding the decision to bring solid waste collection services back in-house.
Using a case study research design, the goal will not be to operationalize specific concepts and
variables but instead will focus on studying naturally occurring events within a case and
identifying the primary reasons for remunicipalization. The city of Ottawa is an example of the
remunicipalization of waste collection services and will serve as the single unit within the case
study analysis; this case has not been found in academic literature or been logged by The Future
is Public. In 1998, Ottawa contracted out solid waste collection in three zones, and retained inhouse collection in a fourth zone. However, in 2011, the City renewed the first in-house contract,
and voted to bring a second zone back in-house. While online news outlets briefly covered this
issue, there has been no real in-depth academic research on the reasons that affected the decision
to remunicipalize.
Not only is Ottawa an example of remunicipalization of waste collection services, but it is also
a unique case. With a population of over 990,000 people, Ottawa is the largest municipality in
Canada that has remunicipalized waste collection services. A majority of the other cases
identified range from smaller to mid-size municipalities with a population between 20,000 and
170,000. Additionally, the administrative size of the municipality makes it an appealing unit for
this research paper because it gives access to a large database of available information from
committees, city staff, and council. It should be noted that the original intent of this paper was to
analyze Ottawa and Paradise, Newfoundland using a multiple case studies research design. Both
cases would be analyzed and then compared with each other and the larger global trends.
However, Paradise does not have any online records relating to the decision to bring waste
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collection services back-in-house in 2011. COVID-19 has hindered the ability of staff from
Paradise from obtaining records related to this decision, and therefore, the municipality was
removed from the research paper. Based upon a news article produced by CBC News, the main
reason for remunicipalizing waste collection services was because a staff report indicated that an
in-house team could perform the services at a lower cost (CBC, 2011).
Due to COVID-19 prohibiting the possibility of conducting interviews, the method for
collecting information will be through document analysis. The primary method of data collection
was the use of a wide variety of sources including council meeting minutes, committee reports,
staff reports, financial statements, union reports, and media articles. These sources help answer
the research question by covering a wide range of potentially different areas that can have an
influence on the decision; this includes municipal staff who operate the day-to-day tasks and
have an understanding of the costs and challenges associated with the service, councillors who
can bring up external factors that have an effect on the decision, the union’s perspective and
influence on the decision, and the media who can bring to light any public concerns or values
related to the decision. Information was recorded between 2002 and 2012; however, the
information related to the actual decision made in 2011 comes from information gathered
between 2010 and 2011. To narrow down the area of research, this paper only studied decisions
related to waste collection services; this includes the collection and disposing services of
garbage, recycling, organics, and household hazardous waste. Additionally, the information was
gathered only from municipal staff and council members who have control or interest in the
delivery of waste collection services.
The research findings are presented in a chronological timeline starting with the context of the
municipality at the beginning of the previous contract with a private entity and ending with the
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final decision to bring waste collection services back in-house. With the intent to grasp a
complete understanding of what happened in this particular case, several elements are analyzed
throughout the entire decision-making process. The first step involves explaining the context of
each municipality and why the municipality started considering bringing waste collection
services back in-house. This is followed by identifying the actors within the decision-making
process who contributed to the idea of bringing waste collection services back in-house.
Throughout the process, evidence presented by municipal staff or other political actors is studied
to see how they tried bringing back waste collection services; this relates to data metrics used for
measuring how in-house waste collection would provide greater benefits to the municipality than
if a private contractor was selected. Finally, the paper will then look at why the final decision
was made and analyze the particular aspects of this decision, such as what resources were needed
to carry out the service, which particular area the service will be carried out in, etc.
After the entire policy process has been analyzed, the factors will be listed and ranked from
most important to least important reason for bringing in waste collection services back in-house.
There will also be an analysis of the strategy used by actors to bring waste collection services
back in-house. Upon completion of the analysis of the case, the paper will try to compare Ottawa
with the existing global trends of remunicipalization. Based on the literature review, Europe, the
United States, and Canada all demonstrated their most common factors for remunicipalization. In
the United States, the primary reasons to reverse privatize were to promote competition through
a mixed market model, lower costs, improve service quality, and political influence. In Europe,
the main reasons were costs and efficiency, control, and public opinion. Finally, the limited
Canadian examples demonstrated that the main reasons for remunicipalization were costs and
efficiency, flexibility, problems with the contractor, and support from citizens. The data and
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information from Ottawa will be studied to see what similarities and/or differences there are with
each category.

Ottawa: A Case of Remunicipalization
In 1995, the regional municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC) assumed responsibility for the
collection of solid waste from Ottawa and 10 surrounding municipalities. At the time, the level
of services provided to residents was standardized with respect to garbage, recyclables, and leaf
and yard waste (Region of Ottawa-Carleton, 2000). In the fall of 1998, the Regional Council
began to consider altering the levels of service for solid waste delivery. They concluded that this
new contract should be designed to reflect an increased devotion to waste diversion, customer
convenience, and fiscal responsibility. When the contracts were awarded that year, they were
designed to encourage the development of a competitive marketplace in the RMCO for waste
management services. As a result, the Regional Council approved the retention of collection for
Zone C4 (out of 4 total zones) as part of the awarding of the residential waste collection
contracts (Region of Ottawa-Carleton, 2000). In order to track the progress of the in-house waste
collection group, the Regional Council also approved the requirement of an annual financial
audit and annual information report (Region of Ottawa-Carleton, 2000).
In 2001, all the municipalities of the RMCO amalgamated into the city of Ottawa and were
now governed by the city of Ottawa council. In the same year, the City launched an organic
waste diversion pilot program with the goal of increasing waste diversion and saving landfill
space; this program only operated in 9 neighbourhoods and was collected weekly (City of
Ottawa, 2002). During the contract period of 1999 to 2006, Zone C4 had managed to save the
municipality $1,474,641; total savings are a combination of savings as a result of the City’s bid
price compared to the next closest bid and savings as a result of actual costs of the operation
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compared to the City’s bid price allocation (City of Ottawa, 2007). In 2005 when it came to
discuss the details of the new contract, the focus was not on whether the municipality should
continue to collect a portion of waste in-house, but rather on how to improve waste diversion
within the municipality. The Director of Public Works and Services and the Deputy City
Manager had prepared a report to The Planning and Environment Committee, the Corporate
Service and Economic Development Committee, and City Council advocating that the new
collection contract include the current level of services until the implementation of a city-wide
weekly organics curbside collection with a move to bi-weekly garbage collection in 2008 (City
of Ottawa, 2005). Additionally, city staff recommended alternating weekly recycling collection
for the duration of the next contract term to achieve maximum diversion. The reasoning for
implementing a weekly organics program and move to bi-weekly garbage collection was to reach
the 60% waste diversion rate guideline that was approved by the province while also minimizing
the financial impact of waste collection services; the current waste diversion rate of the City was
only 31% (City of Ottawa, 2005).
Based on staff calculations, the decision for implementing bi-weekly garbage collection
would save the municipality $7,570,000 over the 6-year contract as a result of switching from
weekly collection (City of Ottawa, 2005). Additionally, by increasing the participation rate of
residents diverting and sorting waste, the City can extend the municipal Trail Road landfill site
by five years; a goal Council was trying to accomplish. However, other councillors on the
Planning and Environment Committee decried the absence of public consultation and the fact
that the plan was too rushed; other municipalities with bi-weekly pick-up had implemented the
program incrementally (City of Ottawa, 2005). Instead, some councillors wanted weekly garbage
collection to continue after 2008 and organics pick up to continue until the end of the contract in
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2012 and then switch to bi-weekly collection. In 2005 when the contracts were awarded, Council
had approved the more expensive option with the current service level for the first two years of
the 6-year contract and then implementing the organics curbside collection with weekly curbside
garbage collection; organics would be collected weekly from April to November and bi-weekly
from December to March. Furthermore, Council had decided to award the in-house collection
group Zone C3 instead of Zone C4 (which was now contracted to a private contractor); this new
contract would last from 2006 until 2012 (City of Ottawa, 2005).
The new program added several costs to the City, particularly involving the purchase and
distribution of organics bins as well as start-up costs of the Zone C3 in-house collection group,
such as organics collection vehicles and facility upgrades (City of Ottawa, 2008). Monitoring
costs were also added from solid waste inspectors who were providing education on the new
program as part of regular by-law enforcement procedures and measuring customer satisfaction
through set out studies (City of Ottawa, 2008). The new costs of this program to waste collection
services got municipal staff to recommend that Council switch to bi-weekly garbage collection to
save money to help pay for the organics program, educate consumers of the benefits of the
program, and report on the progress of the program (City of Ottawa, 2009). The organics
program was finally implemented in January of 2010 and named “the Green Bin Program”. With
the upcoming contract expiring in the next year, it was becoming clear the City was looking for
ways to save costs in waste collection.
In early 2011, members of the Environmental Advisory Committee were recognizing that costs
were becoming a problem, as the local media had been writing stories on the cost increases; the
costs of waste services included not only pick-up but also sorting and storing (City of Ottawa,
2011). Additionally, the public was concerned that the upcoming changes to waste collection
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would result in less service for tax dollars. However, a member of Council re-assured that they
want to pass the savings down to the taxpayer (Chianello, 2011). A few days later at the
Environment Committee meeting, city staff produced the annual audit report for 2010 to show
the progress of the in-house collection group. When the new contract was awarded to Zone C3 in
2005, the City renewed the requirement for an annual audit report of expenditures and an annual
information report (City of Ottawa, 2011). Table 1 presents the financial performance of the inhouse collection group since the first year of the contract.
Table 1

As previously mentioned, the total savings are a combination of savings as a result of the City’s bid price compared
to the next closest bid and savings as a result of actual costs of the operation compared to the City’s bid price
allocation.

By the end of the 4th year of the contract, the in-house collection group had resulted in a
cumulative operating surplus of $1,210,492 and $4,802,190 in total savings; if the savings from
the last contract are added, then the in-house group saved a total of $6,276,831 (City of Ottawa,
2011). In all the annual audits produced since the beginning of the contract in 2006, the
explanation for the savings was consistent and involved staff reporting that operating savings
resulted from efficient route optimization, managed labour costs, and the productivity of
dedicated and experienced staff.
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The audit was also required to provide the Statement of Operations for the in-house collection
group each year. Table 2 demonstrates a summary of all the Statement of Operations produced
from 2006 until 2010; the fiscal year of operations is from June 1 until May 31 of the next year.

Table 2
Year
Revenue
Labour
Costs
Vehicle
Costs
Materials
and Supplies
Total
Expenditures
Surplus from
In-house
Collection
Operations
Actual
Tonnage
Cost per
Tonne

2005-2006
$3,995,011
$1,903,000

2006-2007
$3,536,617
$1,637,450

2007-2008
$3,588,516
$1,610,268

2008-2009
$3,650,083
$1,715,504

2009-2010
$4,084,684
$1,744,341

$2,206,975

$1,437,010

$1,379,65

$1,588,860

$2,002,390

$84,304

$75,795

$55,578

$76,085

$99,303

$4,412,501

$3,282,252

$3,089,669

$3,406,802

$3,870,688

$417,490

$254,365

$498,847

$243,281

$213,996

54,974 (4
zones)
$80.27

40,750

39,672

38,812

37,485

$80.55

$77.88

$87.78

$103.00

*Revenue is calculated on an accrual basis based on tonnage collected at rates proposed and accepted in the bid
process*

The table shows that since the new contract was awarded, the in-house group had produced a
steady increase in revenue; revenue is calculated on an accrual basis based on tonnage collected
at rates proposed and accepted in the bid process. It should be noted that the only reason there
was a rising average cost per tonne was because the City was collecting less garbage each year,
which was most likely the result of increased waste diversion methods. However, the 2005-2006
year and the 2008-2009-year audits indicated that the in-house collection group average cost per
tonne was lower than the average cost per tonne for the other four collection zones (City of
Ottawa 2007 and 2010). Unfortunately, city staff only made this comparison in the 2005-2006
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and 2008-2009 annual audit report and there was no other financial reporting on the other
collection zones.
Finally, the annual audits included the performance results of the in-house collection group
based on customer service requests. Table 3 represents a summary of the customer service
requests to the City across all the collection zones since the new contract in 2006.
Table 3
Year
Total City
Calls
Total Calls
C3
% of C3
Calls
Avg
Call/1000 C3
Avg
Call/1000
Other Zones

2006-2007
18,036

2007-2008
12, 320

2008-2009
9, 557

2009-2010
9, 938

4,413

3, 736

2, 389

1, 875

26%

30.3%

25%

18.9%

97.53

82.56

52

52

64.96

41.65

33.8

33.8

Out of the 260,000 households, Zone C3 was always responsible for an average of 45,000
households. There was a high increase in customer calls in the first year of the contract for all
collection zones due to the new routes, new collection schedules, and new contractors (City of
Ottawa, 2008). During the rest of the contract up until 2009, all the collection zones had resulted
in a decreased number of calls; this was due to residents becoming familiar with year-to-year
service level changes (City of Ottawa, 2009). However, the annual audit report for 2010
explained that Zone C3 and C2 reported significant call reductions while Zone C1, C4, and C5
reported a significant increase in the number of calls. Each audit clarified some misleading
information when looking at average calls per 1000 homes. The reason why Zone C3 has a much
higher average is because the in-house collection group provides service in the urban core where
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calls are related to property standards and waste issues are historically higher than in suburban
and rural areas. The second reason is many homeowners in the other zones call the contractor
providing service directly rather than calling the City, and thus fewer calls about private
contractors are reported (City of Ottawa, 2011).
At the same Environment Committee meeting when the annual audit was presented and
recommended for Council to receive, the Committee received a response from the City Treasurer
after a city councillor on the Committee had made an inquiry about costs of the garbage, blue,
black, and green bin (organics) program and the Household Hazardous Waste Programs.
Specifically, the Committee wanted to know what the average Ottawa household was paying
through their property taxes for these programs. The Treasurer responded saying based off a
home with an assessed value of $295,000, 3.47% of the tax bill, or $131.65, was allocated to the
cost of garbage collection and recycling programs; $89 was for garbage collection and $42.65
was for all other solid waste program costs (City of Ottawa, 2011).
Two months later at another Environment Committee meeting, a Service Level Review report
was presented by city staff (City of Ottawa, 2011). The report echoed previous staff reports
recommending changing curbside collection service levels for the upcoming 6-year contract in
order to increase waste diversion and to lower costs; the main recommendation was for weekly
organics program and move to a bi-weekly garbage collection schedule. The change in service
would increase the city waste diversion rate by 9%, for a total between 48% and 53%. Staff
recommended that the change in service delivery would save the City around $9,000,000 per
year and $54,000,000 over the six-year life span (City of Ottawa, 2011). This change in service
would also save taxpayers $13 on their tax bill. Council then decided to implement the new Solid
Waste Service Levels for uniform curb side collection across the city, bi-weekly collection of
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residential garbage, weekly green bin collection, and bi-weekly collection program for diapers
and incontinence products, alternating with the residual waste collection (City of Ottawa, 2011).
As a result, they also decided to extend the current waste collection contract by 5 months so the
new collection contracts and solid waste service levels would be effective in November 2012
when the new contracts and service levels started (City of Ottawa, 2011).
Since the contract would be expiring next fall, the Environment Committee made a
recommendation to Council in May of 2011 to establish an in-house team and submit a city bid
for curb side residential waste collection services. To ensure that there would be no bias during
the bidding process, Council had previously adopted a competition protocol in 1998 to provide
both accountability and transparency that could allow for the preparation and submission of an
in-house bid (City of Ottawa, 2011). A staff report indicated two main reasons why the City
should once again bid for residential waste collection services. First, staff re-emphasized the cost
savings that the in-house collection group had accomplished since they were awarded a zone in
1998. Second, the involvement in waste collection services had provided city staff with a more
complete understanding of waste collection challenges and the ability to pilot various alternative
service delivery options with maximum flexibility and minimal financial penalty; an example of
this is the organics pilot program (City of Ottawa, 2011).
The in-house group had provided valuable feedback on collection costs, vehicle trails, and
organics container suitability from the operator’s point of view. The staff believed that this
experience had assisted the City to make practical advancements in recycling and organics trials.
As a result, Council approved the creation of an in-house team and ensured that a Fairness
Commissioner from an independent consulting company would ensure the City’s bid process
was consistent with the competition protocol (City of Ottawa, 2011). Council decided to defer
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this agenda item for one month to allow the continuation of the dialogue city staff was having
with Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) 503 over discussions of the bid (City of
Ottawa, 2011). Discussions with CUPE 503 must have been significant because Council had
deferred this agenda item once again until August to allow the continuation of dialogue between
the City and CUPE 503 (City of Ottawa, 2011).
CUPE 503 produced a preliminary report on solid waste to win back waste collection services
for the in-house group. The union highlighted how the mayor had commemorated and valued the
success that the in-house collection group had provided; the focus was on the cost savings that
in-house group achieved. A large portion of the report focused on debunking the false claim that
contracted services are superior to in-house services. Even though there was still a belief that
contracted services were the better service alternative, the union provided evidence through
several case examples of how municipalities had achieved financial savings and improved
service quality from switching back in-house. The report also echoed arguments that were found
in the literature review, particularly around the fact that studies on waste collection have found
no evidence that private production reduces costs and that cost savings from private contractors
eroded over time (CUPE 503, 2011). The latter section of the report also demonstrated that the
in-house collection group is actually at a disadvantage when bidding on contracts. Estimated
costs of in-house tenders appear artificially higher due to the need to include a wide range of
“ghost costs”; head office expenses allocated to the bid. However, private sector bidders are
spared of these additional costs and obtain an advantage during the bidding process. The union
analyzed that the impact of these ghost charges overstates the cost of an in-house bid by 8%,
which can put the in-house group at a disadvantage (CUPE 503, 2011). Nonetheless, the report
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let the numbers speak for themselves and provided the evidence on how much the in-house
group had saved the City.
The final portion of the union report highlighted the importance of flexibility, and how this
factor is never entered in calculations. The union reminded how Ottawa was able to launch the
pilot organic program because it had the flexibility to do it with its in-house crew. As the City
looks towards increasing waste diversion and potentially moving towards zero generation of
garbage, having in-house collection crews will be invaluable. They can also provide the City
with direct and detailed information on the characteristics and challenges of waste collection
essential for developing policy, as well as the potential to implement more efficient collection
methods on an on-going basis.
Several months later in August, the Deputy City Manager and Department of Infrastructure
Services and Community Sustainability submitted a report for the Environmental Services
Department to establish an in-house team bid; this report was produced with consideration from
CUPE 503 (City of Ottawa, 2011). Staff argued that the City has already had experience in Zone
C3 in the downtown core, which is a high-profile zone that encompasses the downtown business
core and tourist area. Additionally, it is the most difficult zone in the city to collect waste
because of a higher housing density, back alley collection, high pedestrian traffic, parked
vehicles, etc. Nonetheless, City workers have been very successful in providing a high level of
service despite these challenges (City of Ottawa, 2011). Combined with the financial saving and
operational benefits that were presented in the report back in May, staff recommended that
Council award Zone C3 to the in-house collection group and the other four zones be tendered.
There was an emphasis to keep a minimum of one zone to be collected in-house to ensure the
managed competition process continued (City of Ottawa, 2011). This new report was presented
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to Council and the recommendations made were approved, thus awarding Zone C3 to the inhouse collection group and establishing an in-house waste collection bid team (City of Ottawa,
2011).
In November of 2011, city staff produced a report to the Environment Committee which set out
recommendations for who should be awarded a contract in each collection zone. The Fairness
Commissioner also provided a report certifying that the tendering process was done in a fair and
transparent manner. Table 4 demonstrates all the bids made for each collection zones from the 7
bidders.
Table 4
Bidders and
Location
GFL
Environment
East Corp.
Pickering, ON
Malex
Gatineau, QC
Waste
Management
Waterloo, ON
City of Ottawa,
Ottawa, ON
Tomlinson
Environmental
Services Ltd.
Ottawa, ON
BFI Canada
Ottawa, ON
Mill Waste
Systems Inc.
Markham, ON

Price Schedule
Zone C1
$8,275,353.25

Price Schedule
Zone C2
$7,278,353.25

Price Schedule
Zone C4
$6,750,353.25

Price Schedule
Zone C5
$7,568,353.25

No Bid

No Bid

$16,653,582

$16,607,542

$6,158,562

$6,658,285

$6,595,731

$6,895,664

$6,757,197.30

$6,105,570.12

$5,445,795.58

$5,807,713.76

$7,274,559.41

$7,036,459.53

$7,487,117.52

$8,020,613.86

$7,591,219

$8,258,323

$7,814,366

$8,459,799

$6,728,504

$5,998,030

$5,548,628

$6,258,262

Staff recommended that the lowest bidder for Zone C1, C2 and C5 be awarded a contract; the
City was the lowest bidder for Zone C5. Due to residential growth in the current curbside zones,
some boundary changes were required to balance the zone sizes and to take into account natural
geographic barriers (City of Ottawa, 2011). As a result, the staff recommended that Zone C5
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establish 39 positions and delegate authority to the Manager of Public Works for the Fleet
requirements for Zone C5 (City of Ottawa, 2011). Furthermore, the changes to the boundary of
Zone C3 increased the number of households from 45,000 to 55,000 and thus required 7
additional workers. Despite the praise of the in-house collection group, staff recommended Zone
C4 be awarded to the second lowest bidder submitted by Miller Waste Systems Inc instead of
awarding it to the City (City of Ottawa, 2011). The first reason was because it would be very
difficult for the City to get vehicles and fully trained staff in time to start the collection of Zone
C3 and two additional zones by next November. At the same time, the new service levels would
be implemented, and an extra zone would require an increased monitoring capacity. Miller
Waste Systems Inc had proven experience and demonstrated it has the capacity to deliver the
service requirements; they are currently under contract with other municipalities with the similar
size zones (City of Ottawa, 2011). In the end, the benefits of awarding Zone C4 to Miller Waste
Systems Inc outweigh the added cost of awarding the second lowest bidder.
When Council approved the new service levels back in April, the estimated savings were
$9,000,000. However, additional savings of $1,400,000 beyond what was identified at that
Council meeting were recognized as a result of the tendering process for an overall annual
savings of $10,400,000 (City of Ottawa, 2011). Staff stated that the 2012 operating budget would
have to be realigned to reflect a decrease in contracted services and an increase to compensation
costs and fleet costs being related to if Zone C5 was awarded to the City in-house collection
group (City of Ottawa, 2011). The report recommended that the capital budget would be
increased by $3,500,000 for a total authority of $3,750,000 for the acquisition of 13 new
collection vehicles to be funded from the Solid Waste Capital Reserve Fund to be repaid by the
Fleet Replacement Reserve fund, causing no tax pressure in 2012 (City of Ottawa, 2011). The
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Committee approved these recommendations and would recommend them to Council. At the
following council meeting, all the recommendations made by the Committee for the residential
waste collection contracts were approved, thus officially awarding Zone C5 to the City-in-house
collection team (City of Ottawa, 2011). The previous contractor for Zone C5 was Waste
Management, who could not compete with the City as their bid was over $1,000,000 more.
At the same meeting, the Committee also introduced the Phase 1 of Ottawa’s 30-year waste
plan. Within the next 30 years, the population of the City is expected to grow by 300,000 people
and generate an extra 100,000 tonnes of waste per year. There was a growing fear that the two
main landfills could be filled up in 15 years, and so the City needed to act to increase waste
diversion (CBC News, 2011). The mission statement for this plan was to state that by 2042,
Ottawa would have room in its municipal landfill because of the improved rates of reducing,
reusing, and recycling (City of Ottawa, 2011). The City of Ottawa’s dedication to improve waste
diversion through new strategies and programs through a 30-year plan reflects how significant
the decision was to bring back an extra collection zone back in-house. One of the benefits of
having an in-house collection team was the operational benefits of direct participation in service
delivery. The past experience that had demonstrated that the in-house group has the capability to
pilot different programs could have given city staff confidence that it would be a good time to
embark on a more ambitious waste plan.
Phase 1 of the plan established the plan’s vision, guiding principles. goals, and objectives. The
key issues that were addressed in the plan included waste minimization and diversion, asset and
financial management, and management of social and environmental impacts (City of Ottawa,
2011). Several months later, Phase 2 of the plan was introduced to state how the City would
achieve these objectives. There were ten points listed in the possible ways to achieve these
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objectives, and three methods were related to waste collection. One method was to manage assets
wisely by enhancing asset management and efficiency in the collection system. This included
studying different approaches to collect bulky items and allow for a self-supporting dedicated
service (City of Ottawa, 2012). The second point was to manage waste locally, which involved
exploring opportunities for more cost-efficient hauling and processing of recyclables and
organics. The third method was to optimize waste diversion by re-evaluating current collection
systems. In low density communities, the City would monitor the performance of recycling
programs in other municipal jurisdictions to determine if moving to a single stream recycling
program for low density communities who receive curb-side collection would have a positive
impact on participation and material capture rates (City of Ottawa, 2012). In high density
communities, the City would assess the viability of piloting a vacuum waste collection system
during a major high-density redevelopment to determine impact on waste diversion.
Unfortunately, the plans for the Phase 3 were delayed and the plan came to a dead stop. The City
had just begun to restart the planning phases of a new 30-year Waste Plan in 2019 (City of
Ottawa, 2019). However, the decision to bring back a second zone in-house gives them greater
flexibility for trying out new programs that may be involved in this plan.

Discussion and Analysis
After reviewing the entire policy process, it becomes clear that the main reason Ottawa decided
to bring a collection zone back in-house was because of costs. Annual audits were produced to
track how the in-house collection group provided savings to the City based on the City’s bid
price compared to the next closest bid and savings as a result of actual costs of the operation
compared to the City’s bid price allocation. Since the beginning of the new contract in 20062007, the in-house group had saved almost $5,000,000 because of efficient route optimization,
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managing labour costs, and having a productive and dedicated staff. Other reports produced by
staff besides the audits had also repeatedly stated how the in-house team had saved the City
money. When the decision was made to officially award the contracts, Council had decided to
offer the contract to the tender with the lowest bid, thus signifying that cost was the most
important factor in the decision-making process.
But it was not the only reason for bringing back waste collection services. The second most
important reason was to regain public control. Throughout the entire policy process, the mission
of increasing waste diversion was heavily emphasized by staff and councillors. This led to the
introduction of a new organics program and the change in service levels to increase organic
collection to a weekly schedule and reduce garbage collection to a b-weekly schedule. At the
same time the contracts were being rewarded, the City was also drafting a 30-year waste plan to
increase waste diversion. The City staff had already demonstrated that they had ability to pilot
new programs such as the organics program with maximum flexibility and minimum fiscal
penalty. As a result, bringing back waste collection services was also the recognition that the inhouse team could help pilot future projects that could be created in the 30-year waste plan.
The third highest reason for bringing back in waste collection services was to improve the
quality of service. The argument that the in-house team had produced a high level of service was
often cited by City staff and the Environmental Committee. For example, when the annual audit
was presented in 2011 for the 2009-2010-year, Zone C3 had reported a reduction in calls while
three contracted zones had a significant increase in calls. Zone C3 was cited as the hardest zone
to collect because it was located in the downtown core, yet the in-house team still managed to
reduce the number of calls and deliver a quality service. Additionally, the in-house team offered

37

important feedback for the entire waste collection process that could allow the City to
continuously improve their service delivery.
The major actors involved in getting the City to bring back an extra waste collection zone inhouse were city staff, the Environmental Committee, and CUPE 503. The overall strategy used
by these actors was to highlight the positive things that the in-house zone had achieved, rather
than of focusing on any problems from the private contractors. The primary staff members
involved were the Deputy City Manager, the Infrastructure Services and Community
Sustainability Department, and the Environmental Services Department. Their main strategy was
to use the data from the annual audits to highlight the financial and performance success that
Zone C3 had since 2006. Additionally, when advocating to establish an in-house bid team, city
staff showcased how the experience of the in-house collection team had provided valuable
information to improve service delivery. The Environmental Committee had full support of the
decision to bring back a waste collection zone and did not pose any barriers for staff to get these
recommendations to Council. The Environmental Committee had approved all the
recommendations to Council made by staff, including having Council receive the annual audits,
approve the service level changes, approve the establishment of an in-house bid team, and
approving staff recommendations on who should be awarded the contracts for each zone.
The support and effort from CUPE 503 to get a waste collection zone in-house signified how
strong a union presence there is in Ottawa. Before contract talks even began, the union was
already helping City staff prepare the annual audit that would be reported in 2011. Then the
decision for creating a bid team was delayed by several months because the City was still
communicating with CUPE 503. It was clear that the union had a working relationship with City
staff, but the fascinating aspect of this policy decision was how a trade union was able to help
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argue against 6 other private companies for why conducting waste collection services in-house
was the right choice.
Back when the City was debating over the upcoming contracts in 2005, the City agreed to
establish guidelines for the in-house bid process (City of Ottawa, 2005). In these guidelines, the
role of the union was to help develop an in-house strategy and gain the support and interest of
employees in the bid preparation process. But in this case study, it was apparent that the union
also sought to gain the support and interest of the City to bring back in waste collection services.
The union report began by debunking biased facts about privatization from the C.D Howe
Institute and the Toronto Board of Trade. One important finding from the union report was how
ghost charges are applied to in-house teams which puts them at a disadvantage. Finally, their
strategy involved illustrating how the decision to have waste collection services had a greater
long term impact than if the decision was to stay privatized; this was in reference to how
transaction costs are rarely calculated in the contract and can increase costs in a short period of
time from the agreement of the contract.
The ability of CUPE 503 to gather resources to create a detailed and factual report is one of the
key elements that make the union’s role so key in this policy decision. As stated in the literature
review, the likelihood of a union to have an influence on the decision to remunicipalize increases
based on how well they can gather resources and formulate a strong argument for
remunicipalization. But this is not just any ordinary local union. CUPE 503 is part of Canada’s
largest union, which includes over 700,000 members, has 70 offices located throughout Canada,
and an abundant amount of resources for conducting various types of union work; this ranges
from issuing annual reports outlining the union’s work in their areas of responsibility, leading
campaigns, facilitating education, and conducting research in over a dozen employment fields
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(CUPE, 2020). One of the major Canadian research projects from the literature review on
remunicipalization was funded by CUPE (Reynolds, Royer, and Beresford, 2016). The CUPE
website has posted several research articles on the topic of remunicipalization that highlight the
benefits of remunicipalization and what kind of strategy works; this also includes posting articles
highlighting the success of municipalities who have decided to bring a service back in-house
The working relationship between the union and City staff was strong, but a key aspect of
this policy process was the recognition that the mayor was happy that work was being done inhouse. The union report began with recognition from the mayor who values the great working
relationship the City has with the union, and that there is a bright future ahead with in-house
solid waste collection group. This comes from a mayor who has always valued the work of
unions; in 2000, he contributed his entire municipal severance payment to Ottawa’s Union
Mission for Men (National Arts Centre, 2020). In early 2012, the City also reached an agreement
with OC Transpo’s bargaining unit the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 279, which marked
the first time in 23 years that the City and the union have come to a collective agreement before
the expiry of the existing contract (Baker, 2012). Therefore, the overall strength of the union had
an impact on the City’s ability to argue for remunicipalizing a waste collection zone, but the
surrounding positive union atmosphere in the City certainly could have made it easier for the
City to reach a deal with the in-house bidding team.
It is now time to compare the Ottawa case with the larger global trends of remunicipalization
and see what similarities and/or differences can be made. To begin, it is clear that the structure of
how waste is collected in Ottawa resembles the mixed market service delivery model that is
common in the United States. When Ottawa was first amalgamated, they decided to ensure that
at least one zone was kept in-house while the other zones would be put up for tender at the end of
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each contract. As the Ottawa case study demonstrated, having this mixed market model is an
effective way of benchmarking costs and quality with in-house operations. The City kept track of
the financial and service level performance of the in-house zone and concluded that this zone
was saving money while having a high level of service quality. Thus, when the opportunity arose
for the new contract, the City decided to bring in another zone in-house; this now puts pressure
on private contractors to ensure they keep costs low and service level high or else they could be
the next contractor who may lose out on a deal by the end of the next contract.
The main reason Ottawa decided to remunicipalize another waste collection zone was because
of cost; however, this was one of the main reasons for remunicipalization in the United States,
Europe, and Canada as well. Therefore, there is nothing unique about the Ottawa case in this
sense. As mentioned already, the City recognized that the in-house unit was collecting waste
collection at a high level of service; they were operating in the hardest zone to collect while
being one of two zones who reported significant call reductions in the previous year. According
to information gathered in the literature review, Ottawa’s reasoning here was similar to the
United States and Canada, where concerns over the level of service quality was more prevalent
than in Europe. Around 60% of local government managers in the United States cited the reason
for change was because of a decrease in service quality while all of the Canadian cases
surrounding remunicipalization of waste collection services cited service quality as an issue.
On the other hand, Ottawa was more similar to trends in the Canada and Europe that indicated
gaining more control over a service was an important reason for remunicipalizing a service. The
City had future ambitions towards improving waste diversion rates, and one of the strong
elements of having the in-house collection group was their ability to successfully test out a pilot
project (organics collection) without any difficulty or additional costs. Having an extra zone
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allowed the City to regain more control over this service and gave them more flexibility with
how they want operations to be conducted. While this is similar to European examples, it did
differ from the kind of control that German municipalities sought; these municipalities were
seeking political control. But this reason also followed suit with the trend at home, where a
number of Canadian examples cited that they remunicipalized either because they gained the
capacity to take control of a service or because they were disappointed with the private
contractor and wanted to have more control over how the service was managed.
Finally, the strong union influence on the Ottawa decision resembles the strong union
environment that is found in Canada and Europe. According to data obtained from the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the top 5 countries with the
highest trade union density (total amount of union workers divided by total number of workers)
are European (OECD, 2017). The trade union density of those countries ranges from 49% to
90%; however, the population of these countries are near the smallest of the group. Within the
data set, Canada had a trade union density of 33%, which sat in the upper-middle tier of the
countries (OECD, 2017). Canada’s favourable labour relation laws and large public sector are
the two main reason why the country has a high unionization rate. For example, requiring secret
ballot votes in unions reduces unionization success rates and certification attempts; however, five
provinces allow unions to be certified automatically without secret ballot voting (Clemens,
Veldhuis, and Karabegovic, 2005). Additionally, all Canadian jurisdictions permit mandatory
dues payment as a condition of employment. This assures unions secure resources with which
they can undertake advocacy, expansion, and development activities. The public sector in
Canada represents 18% of the workforce, and of that workforce, 75% of workers are unionized
(Clemens, Veldhuis, and Karabegovic, 2005). The United States on the other hand has a much
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weaker union presence; the U.S only had a trade union density of 10% (McCarthy, 2017). A
majority of states allow only partial mandatory dues clauses, which means that workers may only
pay for representation-related union activities. Furthermore, the U.S public sector represents 14%
of its workforce, however, only 40% of these workers are unionized (Clemens, Veldhuis, and
Karabegovic, 2005).
While Ottawa possesses similarities with other global trends of remunicipalization, it still has
some differences. First, there was no evidence that the decision was made to improve public
value or that the public had voiced their support for remunicipalization. Media outlets from The
Ottawa Citizen, and CBC News showed the public was mainly concerned about the service level
changes that were being made. The City held public consultations to hear the public’s opinion
since the City was divided in half on this issue. The service level change was the only decision
that was heavily covered in the media. Aside from that, there was no reporting from the media or
the City that the public wanted to have waste collection services back in-house. This is much
different from the global trends, especially in Europe which showed a long history of citizens
believing services should be conducted by the public sector.
Second, there was no political influence on the decision to bring waste collection services back
in-house. This was only prominent in the United States where some states had weak government
laws that did not hinder political activity from influencing the decision-making process. The City
of Ottawa had a Fairness Commissioner from PPI Consulting that provided independent
oversight throughout the procurement process to select suppliers for residential waste collection
services (City of Ottawa, 2011). PPI produced a report on a summary of the selection process,
and certified that the principles of openness, fairness, consistency and transparency was
established and maintained throughout all the stages of the selection process.
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Conclusion
Ever since the rise of New Public Management, public servants have insisted that adapting
private practices in government will improve service delivery and reduce costs. This led to the
outsourcing of public services in favour of private contractors who would provide these
promised benefits. However, the world has started to recognize that these benefits are not always
delivered, and that in some cases it would be best to bring a service back in-house. The City of
Ottawa is a perfect example of a municipality who decided the right decision was to
remunicipalize one of its waste collection zones back in-house in order to lower costs, improve
service delivery, and regain more control over the service. City staff, councillors, and the union
formulated a strategy that involved highlighting the financial and service level accomplishments
that the City’s in-house team had accomplished, rather than trying to only point out the flaws of
the private contractors. And to this day, Ottawa has retained these two collections in-house. It
should also be noted there have been recent contract problems with private partners (Whan,
2019). If Ottawa ever increases their capability to operate waste collection services, then these
private contractors could soon be on their way out the door.
When comparing the case of Ottawa to the larger global trends of remunicipalization, some
similarities were identified as well as some differences. But the key take away from the
comparison should be that no one case will ever be the same as another. Researchers can try to
gain a larger understanding of remunicipalization from surveys of a large sample size, but a case
study analysis appears to be more beneficial because it generates the details that are needed to
understand the full story of the decision. A large city like Winnipeg who is testing out a pilot
project before potentially remunicipalizing waste collection services should look at a case
example such as Ottawa who may resemble some similar circumstances, resources, problems,

44

etc. It is also recommended more research be done within Canada on cases of remunicipalization
in order to potentially identify any unique reasons for remunicipalization that may have not yet
been identified.
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